Tensions in the Boardroom:A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Governance in the Dutch Financial Sector by Steijvers, E.
VU Research Portal




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Steijvers, E. (2016). Tensions in the Boardroom: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Governance in the Dutch
Financial Sector.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 23. May. 2021
1 
 
English Summary  
 
Chapter 1: The introduction of corporate governance in the Dutch 
financial sector 
We read about it in newspapers, see it on television and talk about it during 
birthday parties, but do we really know what it means to work every day as 
an executive at an organization in the financial sector?  
 
This dissertation tells stories about corporate governance from actors in 
and around the board of governance in the financial sector. After an 
extensive introduction to this research theme, Chapter 1 begins by 
making a distinction between objective and subjective corporate 
governance. This approach to corporate governance, which focuses on 
the number of incidents, can be referred to as the objective approach 
(Duijnhoven, 2010). A striking aspect of this approach is that rules, 
competencies, duties and responsibilities are considered as principles for 
good corporate governance. A question that periodically arises in the 
context of the objective corporate governance is whether laws, 
regulations and codes help to prevent fraud and accounting scandals. In 
accordance with the notion of Duijnhoven (2010), I refer to this attention 
to more implicit aspects as the subjective approach. The present study 
focused on the subjective approach to corporate governance of the 
executives, members of supervisory boards, works councils, employers 
associations, shareholder associations and other actors in and around 
corporate governance. Current developments and a historical overview 
of corporate governance show that corporate governance today is not 
only more about the shareholder and the owner, but also other 
stakeholders such as employees, advocacy groups, media and society. In 
addition, corporate governance is no longer limited to the economic 
distribution of profits, but also involves laws and regulations, ethics and 
corporate social responsibility. Within this broad concept of corporate 
governance, in which many actors and themes play a role, there are also 
various tensions.  
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The theoretical background to the tensions of corporate governance can 
best be explained by referring to Table 1.2. In theory, corporate 
governance can be roughly divided into three categories: the 
shareholder, the stakeholder and the community state welfare 
dimension (Waldman et al., 2006). In addition, two types of approaches 
can be used: instrumental and normative (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In 
the instrumental approach, shareholders, stakeholders and the 
community welfare dimension are defined as individuals or groups that 
provide an important contribution to the continued existence of the 
enterprise (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Janssen (1998) referred to 
target-utility ethics or utilitarianism, in which efficiency thinking is 
dominant. In the normative approach, corporate management not only 
has to deal with financial values, but also with intrinsic values (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). In this section it becomes clear that the theoretical 
tensions of corporate governance link up with the view of the de World 
Bank, which stated that corporate governance aims to ensure a balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals, (Sir Adrian Cadbury at the Global Corporate Governance 
Forum, World Bank, 2000). When a study focuses on how actors give 
shape to the tensions within corporate governance, then particular focus 
is required on how people in everyday life talk about and cope with 
tensions that are related to corporate governance. This means that if one 
wants to know more about how people give shape to corporate 
governance, then one is compelled to delve into how people in everyday 
life make sense of this concept. Building on this approach, the following 
research question is central in this study:  
 
How do actors in and around the board of governance in the financial 
sector make sense of the tensions in corporate governance and how 
does this manifest itself in practice at a bank and a pension fund? 
 
Chapter 2: Making sense of corporate governance  
In the second chapter, the first research question is answered: “How is 
the concept of sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance 
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operationalized in the literature?”. This study began from a cultural 
dimension of corporate governance. It is therefore not surprising that 
the study, the research object and the methodology all have an 
anthropological starting point. In the present study, corporate 
governance is not viewed as a static concept, but as a dynamic one: 
people interact and exchange meanings about corporate governance, 
and they create the effective corporate management themselves. 
According to Weick (2005), the process of sensemaking does not involve 
an accurate and verifiable answer, but a plausible argument. The 
researcher must empathize with the sensemaking of the actor, and place 
herself in the role and the mindset of the subject. In this context, 
Veenswijk (1996) referred to shared signification frameworks and value 
orientations. Berger and Luckmann (1966) introduced the term social 
construction for this process. They assumed that the world is essentially 
meaningless, and is given meaning only by the observer. In other words, 
reality is a construction that takes place in a social context. One way to 
examine how language constitutes a social reality is by doing discourse 
analysis. Roughly speaking, there are two approaches to discourse 
analysis: the linguistic approach and the narrative approach. The 
linguistic approach was inspired by De Saussure (1966), Wittgenstein 
(1976), Derrida (1967, 1972) and Chomsky (1957), and is closely related to 
linguistic theory. Adherents of the narrative approach, such as Barthes 
(1957), Boje (1991), Burke (1969), Czarniawska (1998), Frye (1959), Gabriel 
(2000) and Gergen (1999), are not concerned with how people create 
meanings, as in the linguistic approach, but what they do with meanings: 
causing change and stopping change in textual, real-world and social 
contexts. However, the boundary between the linguistic and narrative 
approach is not clearly demarcated (Pijnenburg, 2004:31), and the 
approaches do not exclude each other. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that in this study, following the example of Alvesson & Karreman (2000), 
Chia, (2000) Grant et al. (2004) Grant and Iedema (2005), Hardy et al. 
(2000), Keenoy et al. (2000) and Oswick et al. (2000), the narrative 
approach is emphasized.  
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The choice of the narrative approach to corporate governance in the 
present study has certain implications. A conceptual framework is 
needed to better understand the practices of corporate governance. The 
conceptual framework of this study is based on two pillars that are linked 
to each other in the conceptual framework. The first pillar consists of the 
narrative lens, which is characterized by stories and narratives. These 
stories provide the data for the analysis, but more importantly they form 
the core of the theoretical part of the study. In this study, the grand 
narratives, variants and counter narratives of corporate governance 
provide the means to look at how actors in and around the board of 
governance make sense of corporate governance and the tensions that 
play a role in this process. The second pillar, which helps to elucidate the 
sensemaking and sensegiving of corporate governance, is the use of 
three narrative concepts: the worldview, institutional framework and 
mode of practice. To operationalize the narrative concepts, the concept 
of ideal types was used. By using ideal types, researchers can map out 
the tensions and provide a theoretical yardstick. In this way, the narrative 
concept of the worldview was operationalized using the ideal-typical 
Newtonian worldview and the ideal-typical holistic worldview. For the 
narrative concept of the institutional framework, the ideal type involved 
the regulatory, cognitive and normative characteristics of institutions 
(Scott, 2001: 33 and Table 2.3.1). And the mode of practice was 
operationalized based on the ideas of Habermas, in which he made a 
distinction between two ideal types (Section 2.3.1) of responsible action: 
strategic action in the systems world and communicative action in the 
lifeworld. By linking the three types of stories to the narrative concepts, a 
narrative table is created which serves as a theoretical point of departure 
for the analysis (Figure 2.4).  
 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
In this chapter, the philosophical and methodological considerations of 
this study are outlined. Ontology is the first philosophical standpoint 
from which to view science. If the description of the three positions of 
ontology is related to the central topics of this study –sensemaking, 
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sensegiving and interaction– then it becomes clear that idealism is the 
most suitable ontological position from which to view reality. The 
ontological assumptions are closely related to the epistemological 
assumptions. The social constructivist perspective of the present study 
has a direct link with interpretivism. The supporters of the interpretative 
approach share an appreciation for the role of language. This focus on 
language also increases the interest in the narrative perspective by the 
supporters of the interpretative approach. This study is qualitative in 
nature in accordance with idealism and interpretivism as philosophical 
standpoints. To understand how executives interpret and make sense of 
corporate governance, an organizational anthropology approach was 
chosen. In contrast to many other scientific disciplines, organizational 
anthropology pays much attention to history, context and processes 
(Bate, 1997). Besides its holistic viewpoint, anthropology has two ways of 
looking at reality: from an emic and etic perspective (Martin, 2002). 
During the various steps of the research process (Table 3.2) for this 
study, both the emic and the etic perspective were used. The researcher 
argues that there could never be a completely insider or outsider 
perspective in research. There is entanglement, but both perspectives 
can be present at the same time. Furthermore, in this study the principles 
of the Code of Conduct of the Association of Dutch Universities such as 
precision, reliability, verifiability, impartiality and independence applied 
(VSNU, 2012). 
 The ontological and epistemological standpoint and the organizational 
anthropology approach had consequences for the research 
methodology. This study into the sensemaking of areas of tension in 
corporate governance takes a organizational anthropology approach and 
is therefore explorational-qualitative in character. It is about identifying 
the guiding principles of corporate governance and improving the 
understanding of the reality construction about corporate governance. 
The fieldwork was split into two phases. The first phase was an 
explorative context study, and the second phase consisted of two case 
studies: BPF and Florabank. Both phases were conducted largely in 
parallel between March 2007 and August 2011. The context study was 
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exploratory in nature; its aim was to acquire knowledge and 
understanding of the sensemaking about corporate governance in the 
financial sector. The following research methods were used to conduct 
the context study: interviews, observations and documentary analysis. 
Phase two of the field research focused on the executives and actors in 
and around the board of governance in a specific organizational context. 
In view of the importance of the context in social constructivist research, 
a case study approach was chosen. Two data collection methods were 
used for the case studies: in-depth interviews and documentary analysis. 
These methods are explained in more detail below. To structure both the 
context study and the case study, Creswell's (2006) six steps for 
analyzing and interpreting qualitative data were used.  
 
Sketches of the context of the financial sector: a brief overview  
This section sketches the context which surrounds both casestudies. 
Financial crisis, greed and bonus culture are key words of this discursive 
context and a brief discussion of them serves to introduce the case 
studies (BPF and Florabank).  
 
Chapter 4: BPF  
This chapter presents the case study of BPF, a sector-wide pension fund, 
with the aim of answering the second research question: “how do actors 
in and around the boards of governance of BPF and Florabank deal with 
tensions within corporate governance”? The findings of this case study 
are presented in this chapter with the aid of logic. Three types of logic 
can be distinguished: the logic of the agent, of the institute and of 
practice. These three types of logic can be considered as three separate 
concepts that can be given shape based on quotations from the 
interviews or narratives from the case study. In Section 4.1 the logic of 
the key players or the actors is addressed. Although the actors in and 
around the board of governance were diverse, it turned out that they 
were all representatives of a constituency or organization, and they 
oriented their thinking accordingly. And due to their education in 
economics or law and their background, they thought in a utility-oriented 
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and rational fashion. The results show that all respondents saw corporate 
governance as rules and regulations. From the findings it is also evident 
that the actors and around the board of governance experienced 
pressure and uncertainty due to the financial crisis, credit crisis and 
banking crisis but in particular by the crisis of trust. Section 4.2 focuses 
on the logic of the institute. Based on the narratives about the initial 
values, the organizational model, the authority and the management 
methods, it is clear which written and unwritten rules are important in 
the organization. The following rules of thumb can be found in the 
narratives: you must be faithful to your constituency, the executive 
board has the final decision, and you must play the formal role that you 
are expected to play. These rules can also be described as the 
institutional logic. Section 4.3 shows that narratives about practice can 
be used to understand that people in practice are faced with various 
types of logic, which are in conflict with each other. The narrative about 
the dual roles shows, for example, that you not only must be faithful to 
your constituency, but that you must also fulfill the collective mandate 
(the formal role). And the tension in the grey area of rules and 
regulations and in the interaction with the DNB shows that there is room 
for action within the areas of tension.  
 
Chapter 5: Florabank  
Like the previous chapter, this chapter also answers the second research 
question, and it presents the findings of the Florabank case study with 
the aid of various types of logic. The aim is not to compare the case 
studies, but to gain insight into the sensemaking about corporate 
governance. The topics in the various sections are therefore not identical 
to the topics in the previous chapter. However, like the previous chapter, 
the three types of logic –actor logic, institutional logic and logic of 
practice– are used to explain the narratives from the case studies. 
Section 5.1 focuses on the logic of the actors. The respondents from 
Florabank can be characterized as a homogeneous group consisting of 
middle-aged Dutch males with backgrounds in economics or law. The 
men hold ancillary positions in foundations and associations in the area 
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of sustainability or which are in line with the original philosophy of the 
Florabank. This background reflects the rational and utility-oriented 
thinking, but also the involvement with the ideals of the bank. 
Furthermore, Section 5.1 shows that the history of the founding of the 
bank appears to play an important role even today. In particular, the 
involvement with respect to the sustainable character and original 
philosophy of the bank characterize the organization. This affinity with 
sustainability can also be seen in the CEO. Besides being an idealist, the 
CEO is also a pioneer and a visionary. He is accustomed to working in a 
solution-oriented fashion, and in his narratives about how he thinks 
about management, the logic of thinking in terms of control is dominant.  
Section 5.2 focuses on the logic of the institute. Based on narratives 
about rules and regulation, culture, bylaws, authority and informal 
structures, it becomes clear which rules of thumb are important in the 
organization. Although this is not mandatory, the actors complied with 
the rules and regulations, but they felt that this is how it should be. The 
bylaws ensure that actors in and around the board of governance of 
Florabank understand their statutory roles and what is expected of them. 
Besides formal rules, there is also an informal world within Florabank. In 
this informal world, the CEO plays a directing and controlling role. 
Another important unwritten rule is that you must feel connected to the 
mission of the bank. Section 5.3 shows that narratives about practice can 
be used to understand that people in practice are faced with various 
types of logic, which are in conflict with each other. The narrative about 
the criticism of rules and regulations shows, for example, that the 
respondents experience the implementation of rules and regulations as 
very burdensome. The respondents indicated that they look for the grey 
areas in the rules and regulations. The narrative about informality and 
formality shows that there is space to choose how one acts, but that one 
is simultaneously held captive in the system of informal and formal rules. 
The last story about the balance between ideals shows that actors have 
different ideas about the implementation of their ideals. These different 




Chapter 6: A narrative analysis 
This chapter presents the analysis of this study. The starting point for this 
analysis was the narrative table in the chapter on theory (Table 2.4). This 
narrative table was filled in by zooming in on the text and zooming out 
on the environment, and by linking the micro and macro levels with each 
other (Fairclough, 1992). The findings from the case studies have shown 
that this can be described as a narrative soup (Boje, 2001). Three basic 
narratives about corporate governance can be distinguished: corporate 
governance is complying with rules and regulations (Section 6.1.1), 
corporate governance is attaching value to written rules (Section 6.1.2), 
and corporate governance is maintaining a balance between various 
interests (Section 6.1.3).  
 
This study has shown that the tensions in corporate governance occur in 
three ways.  
First there is tension between the grand narratives and the counter 
narratives (Section 6.2.1). In the first narrative, although people want to 
comply with the rules and regulations, they simultaneously have to deal 
with practical considerations that sometimes make this impossible, and 
with the fact that they are operating a company or organization and are 
held to account for the financial results. In the second narrative on 
corporate governance, the tension is between the formal and informal 
worlds. And in the third basic narrative, people act on one side to 
maintain a balance between the various interests, and the other side they 
pursue the collective interest (BPF) or the organizational interest 
(Florabank). Based on the examples from the case studies, the tensions 
are explained.  
Second, there is a diversity of tensions between the individual, 
organizational and societal levels of corporate governance (Section 
6.2.2). One example of tension between the individual and organizational 
level is the conflict about the practical feasibility of the bank's ideals. An 
internal discussion took place within the bank about how the ideals 
should be given shape in practice. In Section 5.3.4, it is shown how this 
can lead to tensions. Section 4.3.5 also shows how the tension between 
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the organizational and social levels of corporate governance influence 
the actions within an organization. Due to pressure from the media and 
from the societal debate on investing in cluster munitions, both DPF and 
Florabank revised their investment policies.  
Third, the analysis showed that there are tensions within and between 
the narrative concepts. In Section 6.2.1 it becomes clear that the 
Newtonian worldview is dominant among actors in and around the board 
governance at both BPF and Florabank. Personality traits also turned out 
to be decisive for actions in and around the board governance. For 
example, the personality traits of the CEO have consequences for these 
actions. Moreover, the neoliberal context of this era can be 
determinative for the worldview. Notably, the interviews at both BPF and 
Florabank showed that developments were ongoing which could not be 
dealt with by the Newtonian worldview. One example is how the actors 
deal with journalists and freethinkers who are important opinion leaders 
in the societal debate. From Section 6.2.2, it emerged that the regulative 
and cultural-cognitive anchors are dominant. The historical narratives 
turned out to play a major role in this respect. It is striking that the 
normative anchors played a subordinate role. The regulative, cultural-
cognitive and normative anchors showed that habits, morals and 
interests –as unintended side effects– also produce and transform 
unequal relationships. Section 6.2.3 makes it clear that both strategic and 
communicative action took place at BPF and Florabank. From both case 
studies it emerged that communicative action resulted in positive 
experiences for executives as well as other actors. The study also 
revealed that the personality traits of the members and the composition 
of the board determine the choice for communicative or strategic action.  
 
The third research question “Which explanatory factors can be identified 
in and around the boards of governance in the financial sector that 
elucidate the tensions in corporate governance?” is also answered in this 
chapter. Three factors emerged from the analysis that can explain the 
areas of tension within corporate governance: scene, space for 
improvisation and conflicting plotlines (Section 6.3).  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
The general conclusion of this study is that the tensions in corporate 
governance involve the search for a balance of power. This is consistent 
with the assertion of Cools (2005) that corporate governance is about 
the balance of power. This general conclusion can be explained in three 
ways. Firstly, the analysis showed that the tensions between the grand 
narratives and the counter narratives always involve conflicting interests 
and double roles. Secondly, in corporate governance there are tensions 
between the individual and organizational level and the societal and 
organizational level. The study also showed that there is a gap between 
this everyday practice and the individual and society, in which there is a 
power struggle between economic and social values. And thirdly, the 
actors in and around the board of governance in both case studies were 
confronted with a new era characterized by power shifts in which people 
struggled with concepts such as democracy and internationalization.  
The contribution of this study to theory lies in its narrative approach. This 
narrative approach contributed to the insights on corporate governance 
and showed that corporate governance is a broad, dynamic, complex and 
powerful concept. The narrative model about being, valuing and acting 
(Figure 2.3) showed how the practice of corporate governance can be 
viewed from the perspective of theory. Furthermore, this study has 
provided a conceptual framework which could potentially be used to 
perform future research. A number of theoretical insights also emerged 
from the study, such as the explanatory factors for the tensions in 
corporate governance. The study contributes to practice at three levels: 
the individual, the organizational and the societal. These practical 
insights are presented in Section 7.2.  
 
The final section of the study closes with a number of reflections and 
predictions about the concept of corporate governance. This study 
shows that the concept of corporate governance is not only seen as an 
answer to the problems of the financial sector, but also that this concept 
goes astray in the boardroom: the board members make mistakes about 
the path they must take. They commit a wrong deed or cherish an 
incorrect thought, while believing they are acting correctly. Corporate 
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governance thus appears to be more of a narrative-based reinforcement 
of the problems than an effective solution.  
 
One of the main reasons this happens is that all of the narratives showed 
that corporate governance is almost always viewed instrumentally and 
rarely from a normative approach. This could be explained with the term 
bounded morality (Beitz, 1979; Torsello, 2015). A second closing thought 
is that this study has shown that rules and regulations are only part of 
the solution, but that there is also space for the actors in and around the 
boards of governance. The observation that rules and regulations do not 
always help organizations towards proper behavior led me to the 
thought that the moral perspective is also lacking here. This observation 
is not new in the social sciences. Acker (2006), a gender studies scientist, 
previously used the term inequality regimes to describe how interlocked 
practices and processes result in continuing inequalities in all work 
organizations.  
 
My final closing thought concerns the question, what is the future of 
corporate governance? Answering this question is not a simple task. For 
this purpose, I used two visions. The first vision is based on the writing of 
the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn (1962) is convinced that 
change occurs through sudden paradigm shifts, i.e. changes in 
worldview. The existing worldview will be replaced because the 
corresponding generation of executives will die, and new worldviews will 
emerge with new generations of executives. Contrasting with the vision 
of Kuhn is another vision in which people can actually make a difference. 
Two examples are the change management model of Lewin (1951) and 
the 8-step model of Kotter (1996). The underlying vision is that 
practitioners can learn from good experiences, and abandon other 
experiences in favour of better ones, which leads to changing practices. 
The study made one thing clear: both of the above narratives are credible. 
Moreover, although the opinions and ideas about change differ, in both 
narratives a change within corporate governance does take place. 
Notably, however, in both narratives there is no urgency for change. Even 
today it seems that no real urgency for change is felt or experienced. The 
lack of a moral perspective could possibly play a role here as well.  
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According to the researcher, corporate governance must be viewed from 
a broader perspective. The Newtonian worldview will shift to the broader 
perspective of the holistic worldview. Actors must view corporate 
governance from the perspective of the individual and the environment 
(being). When changes occur, such as investing in cluster bombs no 
longer being socially acceptable, one must consider not only cluster 
bombs but also (more broadly) other things that may not be accepted in 
the future, such as investing in fossil fuels.  
 
In the institutional framework, the emphasis should not be on narrow 
regulatory characteristics such as stringent laws and regulations, but 
should be placed in a broader perspective. Actors in and around the 
boards or governance will have to pay more attention to cultural aspects. 
They should reflect on the present tensions and then initiate a discussion 
on the established structures for interaction, behaviour and control. A 
notable finding in this study is that many tensions surrounding corporate 
governance actually involve the lack of attention to normative 
characteristics. Within organizations, people should more frequently ask 
themselves essential questions, such as how is the function of the 
organization interpreted? How are the moral and philosophical guidelines 
for the implementation and management of the organization 
interpreted? Are the social values such as freedom and the foundation of 
self-esteem applied to everyone? Is there agreement between the values 
propagated by the executive board and the values of society? 
 
Moreover, the mode of practice for actors in and around the boards of 
governance calls for a broader perspective: reflection on action. I close 
with a reflection. What would happen if actors no longer assumed that 
the executive board is responsible for the results of an organization, but 
instead held the executive board accountable for the process in which 
consensus is important? According to the researcher, this new approach 
would mean viewing things more from a broader perspective in which 





There will always be tensions in the future and these may even increase, 
but by viewing corporate governance from a broader perspective, actors 
in and around the boards of governance will be better equipped to deal 
with Tensions in the boardroom. 
